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INTRODUCTION        
This paper will argue first that Mexico’s incapacity to develop a coherent national 
and regional security framework has paralleled Mexico’s inability to undergo a 
reformation of the Mexican State, and with it, of national security reform. Second, 
rather than true democratic change, authoritarian legacies have been more robust 
and abundant in Mexico since the arrival of the right wing, the National Action Party 
(PAN), in the year 2000. Third, the controversial result of the 2006 presidential 
election in Mexico has exacerbated the polarization between the right and the left to 
construct consensus and platforms for local and national security regarding 
terrorism, natural disasters, and drug trafficking due to the lack of “legitimacy” in the 
new government.1 These circumstances encapsulate the current Mexican framework 
and highlight the exacerbation of threats and vulnerabilities Mexico faces in order to 
address the changing regional and international security environment and the 
prospect of creating a “new” security perimeter in North America.  
BEYOND A DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
In the 1990s several academics argued that a Mexican transition to democracy was 
the only way to develop a coherent national security doctrine for the country because 
the corrupt nature of the Mexican political system created sources of instability and 
distrust in Mexico and abroad after decades of a single party in power. For example, 
in 1996 Guadalupe Gonzaléz stated that democracy could “give the country enduring 
stability and internal peace. Genuine democratization requires not just clean and fair 
elections but also effective administration of justice and decentralization of power.”2 
Today, Mexico’s transition to democracy is in question after the 2006 presidential 
election. Despite the political opening in 2000, the Fox administration did not 
manage to develop a coherent national security doctrine, structure, organization. or a 
solid legal framework. Unfortunately, the new government of Felipe Calderón has not 
delineated the bases of a global and integral plan of state reform on national security 
especially in terms of Mexico’s deepening integration with its North American 
neighbors of Canada and the United States. Within its current political, institutional, 
and conceptual vacuum, Mexico is much more vulnerable and unsafe than a decade 
ago and unable to effectively defend its national interests. Were the assumptions of 
the 1990s wrong? Or is the lack of a national security doctrine in Mexico today the 
outcome of intense and deep divisions among the political elites? What are the 
consequences for North American regional security initiatives? 
EXPLORING SOME EXPLANATIONS  
In 2000, the Mexican transition to democracy equipped Vicente Fox with 
unprecedented legitimacy, not only for the government, but for the viability of the 
Mexican State. The “democratic bond” given to the new government through the 
ballot boxes was a historical opportunity to (1) redirect the relationship with the 
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United States and (2) carry out the reform of the state and the national security 
apparatus. 
Some of the first successes of Mexican foreign policy were the suspension of the 
decertification policy by the U.S. Congress, the recognition of a North American 
Community, initial negotiations of migratory reform, and the public acceptance by 
the Bush administration that Mexico was “the most important nation for U.S. foreign 
policy.”3 For President Fox and his then minister of foreign relations, Jorge G. 
Castañeda, their proactive initiatives represented an important departure from the 
defensive nature of Mexican foreign policy in their first months of power. Within the 
new government – the Commission of Order and Respect led by Adolfo Aguilar 
Zinser – the national security advisor had the responsibility to coordinate a long-
term perspective on national security, national sovereignty, preservation of the rule 
of law, democratic governability, public security, administration of justice, and 
honest government in coordination with cabinet members including:4 
          
        Minister of the Interior 
         Minister of Defense                  Commissioner in Order and Respect, Adolfo Aguilar 
        Minister of Army 
         Department of Justice 
Theoretically, the proactive foreign policy and the institutional framework on 
national security, focused in the preventive agenda, meant a substantial 
improvement in democratic governance in Mexico. But, in reality, disorganization 
and political infighting eclipsed the good intentions presented by Fox’s 
administration since the very beginning. In fact, a Mexican national security strategy 
failed to develop for several reasons. On the one hand, Fox was unable to conceive a 
project that encapsulated the diverse interests of his interior ministry, nor was he 
able put into action an effective plan to assuage an opposition Congress. On the other 
hand, the Mexican Congress and the political system itself reduced the real power of 
the executive due to its legacy of contradictions, limitations, and authoritarian 
inertia. An illustration of Fox’s limitations on matters of national security was 
confirmed in his books published before he became president. For example, in Fox a 
Los Pinos, un recuento autobiográfico, he does not present a strategy on security.  
Rather, he confuses concepts and methodologies; his main preoccupation is, and his 
energy focuses on, defeating the PRI. In his second book, Vicente Fox Propone, he 
maps out a series of proposals for government, but offers no clear strategy on 
security and foreign policy.5 Once in power, in his National Plan of Development Fox 
presented a strategy, which was conceived by Adolfo Aguilar Zinser after having a 
serious confrontation with Jorge G. Castañeda, regarding the organization of 
government. In any event, the strategy on security was very ambitious and included 
Zinser’s desire to create a new doctrine, concept, and law compatible with democratic 
consolidation and respect for human rights. Moreover, the new national security 
advisor proposed to define the threat in the following terms: poverty, organized 
crime, drug trafficking, and natural disasters. However, any initial prerogatives to 
develop a national security law eroded, soon after the government took power on 
December 1, 2000, as a result of a series of contradictions among the cabinet 
members.    
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Today it is evident that the ministers of foreign relations and the interior, Jorge G. 
Castañeda and Santiago Creel, respectively, were more preoccupied with their 
personal agendas than consolidating a democratic government and performing the 
duties of their cabinet positions. Both figures wanted to be presidential candidates, 
Castañeda as an independent and Creel as a member of the National Action Party. 
However, both politicians failed in their ambitions to gain power.  
Furthermore, according to the Mexican Constitution, foreign policy is conducted 
by the president.6 Yet, under the Fox administration, foreign policy was carried out 
by Castañeda (2000-2003). This system created many problems for the military, an 
institution subordinate to the president under Mexican law. As the driving force 
behind the president’s national security agenda, military leaders were reluctant to 
comply with Zinser’s Commission of Truth and Commission of Order and Respect or 
Castañeda’s proactive agenda. These new institutional arrangements within the Fox 
administration created major differences in the government. Additionally, Fox did 
not have a majority in the Chamber of Deputies nor in the Senate, and since his 
arrival in power he had to battle the opposition in Congress to get consensus on his 
domestic political reforms.   
THE TRANSITION  
In addition to the political dynamics within Mexico, it is important to highlight the 
impact of the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001.  Just days 
before the attacks President George W. Bush stated that “the United States has no 
more important relationship in the world than the one we have with Mexico.”7  
Bush’s declarations looked to inaugurate a new relationship. For Mexico, and Fox in 
particular, this was a golden opportunity to talk to the United States face-to-face as 
equal partners. However, the devastating impact of 9/11 completely reshaped the 
perceptions, structures, and priorities, not only of the White House, but of the United 
States and the international system. Once the international system was radically 
transformed by 9/11—as were U.S. priorities with regards to foreign policy and 
national security—the nature of bilateral relations between Mexico and the United 
States was deeply transformed.   
In contrast to the United States’ aggressive foreign policy in the wake of 9/11, 
Mexico was unable to articulate a coordinated, clear, and strong response to the 
United States and the concomitant changes in the international system. Moreover, 
President Fox’s responses to the terrorist attacks were ambiguous and cold. His 
government became divided after 9/11 over its relationship with the United States. 
For example, the minister of foreign relations was not careful in crafting a Mexican 
response to the attacks, stating that “an attack on the U.S., it is an attack on Mexico.”  
The minister of the interior diverged from Castañeda with a more nationalistic 
approach. The Mexican Armed Forces were reluctant to declare support for 
Castañeda. National Security Advisor Adolfo Aguilar Zinzer attempted to coordinate 
and expedite a response to the terrorists attacks that came from an agreed-upon list 
of Mexican vulnerabilities developed prior to 9/11. Lastly, the Mexican Congress was 
hesitant to allow President Fox to visit the United States, while leaders around the 
world traveled to Washington to pay their respects to those who had died. Mexico 
was divided and its response to U.S. security concerns was extremely uncoordinated 
in the aftermath of 9/11.    
For the Fox administration, 9/11 was a failure for Minister of Foreign Relations 
Jorge G. Castañeda and his agenda on migratory reform. The notion of the “whole 
enchilada” disappeared in Washington.8 Furthermore, Castañeda experienced 
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several problems within his own office in articulating a national response to the 
United States. For example, the Armed Forces disagreed with the declarations of 
“total” support to the United States made by Castañeda. The minister of the interior, 
Santiago Creel, favored a response based on the Mexican Constitution.9 Hence the 
national security advisor experienced drastic institutional constraints to articulating 
a national response due to the lack of a constitutional law and full agreement on a 
national security agenda within the Fox administration. As a result, Aguilar Zinser’s 
efforts to develop a State response failed dramatically.10 In the end, the President did 
not support the national security advisor and Castañeda ran into problems 
communicating his agenda to the Cabinet, Congress, and the Mexican public in 
general. This latter episode is crucial to understand the fragmentation of the Fox 
administration in terms of national security, foreign policy, and Mexico’s 
relationship with the United States.  
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that internally, at the Commission of 
Respect and Order, there was an institutional effort to develop an integrated Mexican 
response to 9/11. For example, the minister of the interior, through the intelligence 
services and the National Institute of Migration, supervised all points of trans-border 
movement; the secretary of defense implemented a plan for the protection of the 
Mexican population and critical infrastructure along the U.S.-Mexican border; the 
secretary of marine acted to monitor the oil industry in the Mexican gulf; the 
secretary of transportation mobilized resources inspecting airports and customs in 
coordination with the secretary of public security; and the Ministry of Treasury  
enacted an analysis of external investments and the Mexican Stock Exchange, among 
other institutional resources. Unfortunately, the Commission of Order and Respect 
was unable to convince the Cabinet and the president of the urgent need for creating 
a master plan on national security vis-à-vis the devastating situation in the United 
States and, over all, the internal dynamics of Mexico. Additionally, Aguilar Zinser’s 
efforts to develop a policy recommendation in order to conceive a master plan for 
national security disappeared from the Fox administration’s agenda and did not 
reemerge throughout the rest of his presidency.   
Certainly, after 9/11, the idea of migratory reform collapsed and Washington’s 
priorities were reshaped by the security agenda.  With 9/11 came an end to the 
aspirations of Fox and Castañeda to deepen economic and social integration in North 
America through a customs union.11 
POST 9/11 CONSEQUENCES IN MEXICO  
The terrorist attacks in the United States demonstrated the necessity for Mexico to 
develop a policy of prevention in the protection of its national infrastructure and 
establish a better system to coordinate within its own structures of government and 
with the United States. Additionally, institutional contradictions, the absence of a 
national security project by the Fox administration, and the compounding problems 
presented by the diverse personal interests of other cabinet ministers made it more 
evident that a national strategy would not be forthcoming. In fact, national security 
coordination was dismantled and the national security advisor was sent to the United 
Nations, exacerbating the contradictions in Mexican foreign policy.  
This vacuum created by the loss of a major actor in national security decision 
planning led to several problems. First, Mexico lost a golden opportunity to develop a 
democratic national security agenda. Second, the government did not take advantage 
of its chance to conceptualize a national strategy. Third, the lack of an 
institutionalized, conceptually coherent strategy, combined with national security 
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law, revealed Mexico’s vulnerabilities. Consequently, the Mexican government 
experienced a political, conceptual, and institutional vacuum and was unable to 
coordinate, plan, and administer the resources of the state in order to cooperate 
effectively with the United States. 
Moreover, between January 2002 and March 2003, it was not clear who was in 
charge of coordinating national security in Mexico. According to the Constitution, the 
president and the minister of the interior are responsible, and after the departure of 
Zinser to the United Nations, the Fox administration neglected to clearly define new 
roles within his government.  Some general ideas were announced in April 2003, but 
no strategy was defined.12 After 9/11, the contradictions within the Fox 
administration were exposed when the national security advisor was sent to the 
United Nations without coming to an agreement on a new strategy within his own 
cabinet. Equally important, Aguilar Zínser was not supported by his former political 
ally and friend, Jorge Castañeda. In fact, Castañeda was against his appointment.13 
Subsequently, they became political enemies with very different positions on several 
issues. Castañeda was in support of the White House; Aguilar Zínser was against the 
war and in favor of United Nations participation regarding the war on Iraq. These 
major differences exacerbated the position of the Mexican government and created 
tension in the bilateral relationship with the United States. They also further 
emphasized that Fox did not have a plan. 
In Mexico, policy makers were divided in the face of the new national security 
environment. The United States had responded to 9/11 with a radical unilateral 
initiative championed by President Bush and his administration beginning 
September 20, 2001. President Bush received extraordinary support from the U.S. 
Congress and public opinion to respond forcefully to the terrorist attacks. 
Accordingly, the United States established a new National Security Doctrine, 
inaugurating the U.S. Northern Command, the Department of Homeland Security, 
and initiating wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of its war on terrorism. 
The current U.S. strategy has reshaped perceptions in Mexico regarding the 
United States. In general terms, the war in Iraq was not supported by the Mexican 
government and Mexican public opinion. As a result, Jorge G. Castañeda left his 
position as minister of foreign relations due to the lack of support in Washington for 
his migratory reform and his impasse with the ambassador to the United Nations, 
Adolfo Aguilar Zínser.14 In addition, bilateral relations changed when the former 
governor of Pennsylvania, Tom Ridge, was made the new U.S. cabinet-level official in 
charge of homeland security.   
Mexico was unable to develop a national security strategy, before and after 9/11. 
The contradictions and constraints in Mexico’s relationship with the United States 
have become more tangible due to Mexican opposition to the U.S. unilateral national 
security strategy, which continues to generate negative reactions instead of cordial 
coordination and support. For practical purposes, the U.S. strategy to defeat 
terrorism and transnational crime is exacerbating an already fragmented Mexican 
state, despite the fact of a bilateral relationship in progress.  In sum, the United 
States has a national, regional, and global security strategy to deal with the world, 
while Mexico’s response has been reactive and short-sighted. This is due in large part 
to Mexico’s history, size, geographic position, and plurality of views.  For instance, 
this lack of a coordinated response is creating obstacles to maximize its cooperation 
in North America. Currently, there is not a single unified strategy for addressing the 
types of security challenges Mexico faces internally and abroad, nor for the type of 
policies Mexico needs to implement regarding organized crime and drug trafficking, 
much less for terrorism.   
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MEXICO IN THE NEW PERIMETER SECURITY DISCUSSION 
Concurrent with the inauguration of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the economic crisis of 1994-95, U.S. secretary of defense, William 
Perry, led a historic visit to Mexico in 1995 promoting a close alliance with the 
Mexican Armed Forces as the “third link” in the U.S.-Mexico relationship. In this 
light, the U.S. strategy was to create a close relationship in trade, politics, and 
security matters to anticipate major challenges to American security. All of these 
changes were conducted during the initial stages of the Zedillo administration, which 
has been referred to as the weakest Mexican presidency throughout the PRI’s 
seventy-one years of power.15  However, under the Zedillo administration a new 
approach to security and military affairs was inaugurated with the United States in a 
post-cold war context. This relationship was “fractured” when the Mexican drug czar, 
General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, was found guilty of linking the Mexican military – 
as an instrument of power – to drug cartels in 1997.16 In the end, those encounters 
formed the bases of a new approach to security relations with the United States, one 
not seen since World War II. Corruption in Mexico’s government illuminated a series 
of structural setbacks in security planning and security coordination at the top of 
government. Paradoxically, today there is still an urgent need for reform of all 
civilian and military intelligence services within the Mexican government. From 
another perspective, Robert Pastor is right when he points out some of the major 
deficits of NAFTA, after thirteen years, with regard to its broader security 
implications for the hemisphere: 
First NAFTA was silent on the development gap separating Mexico from its 
two northern neighbors, and that gap has widened. Second, NAFTA did not 
plan for its success; and inadequate roads and infrastructure cannot cope with 
increased traffic. The resulting delays have raised the transition costs of 
regional trade more than the elimination of tariffs has reduced them. Third 
NAFTA did not address immigration, and the number of undocumented 
workers in the U.S. jumped. Fourth, NAFTA did not address energy issues, 
and eastern Canada and northeastern U.S. suffered a catastrophic power 
black-out in August 2003, even while Mexico imports natural gas from the 
United States. Fifth, NAFTA made no attempt to coordinate macro-economic 
policy, leaving the region with no way to prevent market catastrophes such as 
the Mexican peso crisis. Finally, NAFTA was silent about security, and 9/11 
threatens to cripple the North American integration process by placing new 
and formidable barriers in the path of trade and movement of people.17 
After 9/11 the definition of U.S. security was redirected and the defense of the 
homeland became the cornerstone of its new architecture for the twenty-first 
century.  This new approach was reminiscent of that used in the period following 
World War II, when the United States reorganized its national security apparatus 
and created the National Security Council, the position of secretary of defense, the 
Department of Defense and the CIA to anticipate the risks to U.S. security interests. 
For fifty years, this equation dominated the U.S.-Mexico relationship – with its 
respective adjustments and changes – but now it is insufficient to meet the new 
threats to the region. The question today is how should the relationship between the 
two countries change?  
MEXICO, SECURITY AND DEFENSE IN NORTH AMERICA     
On April 17, 2002, in the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Air 
Force General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, revealed one of 
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the most important changes to the structure of the Department of Defense since 
1946, announcing the emergence of the U.S. Northern Command. The creation of the 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM), as well as other changes, extended U.S. military 
forces to “cover the whole Earth for the first time.”18 The transformation consisted of 
putting NORTHCOM on a par with the North American Aerospace Command 
(NORAD). The second structural change within the Pentagon’s new Unified 
Command Plan was the extension of the U.S. European Command to cover Russia.  
The Pentagon also announced that the U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Southern 
Command would remain in their present positions; however the U.S. Pacific 
Command would narrow its relation with the European Command and expanded its 
area of responsibility to Antarctica. Under this framework, the United States “must 
be ready to win today's global war on terror, but at the same time prepare for other 
surprises and uncertainties that we will most certainly face in the 21st century.”19 
This announcement is consistent with the U.S. Homeland Security Strategy which 
was deeply altered by the effects of Hurricane Katrina, a major natural disaster in 
2005.   
In any event, one of the conclusions of the Second Symposium of Homeland 
Defense, held in Colorado Springs, Colorado in October 2004, was to increase the 
communication channels and "cooperation" with Mexico in projects that include the 
protection of North America. The symposium also emphasized the cooperation and 
the interoperability of NORAD and the expanded security relationship between the 
United States and Canada with regard to both maritime and territorial threats (not 
just airspace). 
After his re-election in 2004, President Bush redefined and provided greater 
depth to a number of security measures. For example, Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Homeland Security Paul McHale outlined the tasks that would include greater 
and better cooperation with Mexico. However, at the beginning of this new approach, 
Mexican Secretary of Defense General Gerardo de la Vega did not recognize 
NORTHCOM as an interlocutor in its relations with Mexico.20 A second problem 
stemmed from the first goal of the command: “Maintain and improve its capabilities 
to defend the United States and North America unilaterally [emphasis added] or in 
concert with allies.”21 The statement that the United States would take unilateral 
action in North America is not only a latent and permanent threat for the Mexican 
Armed Forces, it also contradicts the Mexican Constitution and the idea of 
sovereignty that exists in Mexico. With regard to collaboration and coordination in 
North America, Mexico will be hard pressed to offer support to U.S. policies that 
encourage unilateral action under “extraordinary circumstances” within its territory. 
The current framework obstructs real security coordination with Mexico. Through 
years of experience some sectors of the Pentagon, the American Embassy in Mexico 
City, and American academics understand the Mexican sovereignty issue (even 
NORTHCOM’s emblem is seen by some sectors in Mexico as a threat to a sovereign 
nation).22  Despite this knowledge of Mexican politics, the United States is currently 
preoccupied in establishing an area of security in North America, beyond its border 
with Mexico.  
For instance, since Bush’s reelection in 2004, there is greater coordination within 
the U.S. government to intensify and explore channels of cooperation with Mexico. 
Accordingly, Paul McHale declared “the message that we have communicated to 
Mexican military authorities is we are looking for a much closer level of 
engagement.”23 The current U.S. stance is consistent with the goals and mission of 
the Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland Security; as well as with the new 
intelligence mission of the director of national intelligence to coordinate and 
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safeguard the American interests. Accordingly, the United States has fortified the 
transatlantic relationship with Britain, NATO and the European Union, as well. 
In 2005, during the tri-national summit between the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico in Waco, Texas led by Presidents Bush and Fox and Prime Minister,Paul 
Martin, President Fox showed a change of attitude when he agreed to establish the 
“Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America.” For practical purposes, his 
statements represented a major compromise in protecting the borders and economic 
development of the region.24 The bottom line is that Mexico does not have an 
internal security strategy, has much less relative to the new security “perimeter,” and 
the new law recently approved by the Mexican Congress is limited in scope.25 It does 
not provide a long-term strategy that would overcome the limitations of Mexico’s 
national security apparatus. To better coordinate with the United States, Mexico will 
have to forego its current ambiguous, discretionary policy mechanisms demonstrated 
by the Ministry of the Interior and the National Security Research Center (CISEN in 
Spanish). In addition, the new minister of the interior has little experience in 
national security or the democratic governability needed to harmonize the security 
apparatus. It is doubtful whether he will be able to work with the Mexican Congress 
to develop strategies to anticipate threats and address the dilemmas of coordination 
that could potentially arise with the United States and Canada in case of an 
emergency situation.   
THE CALDERON ADMINISTRATION  
The disputed outcome of the Mexican presidential election on July 2, 2006 marked a 
fracture in Mexico with some precepts of legitimacy, certainty, legality, and 
credibility. Doubts about and a lack of transparency in the performance of electoral 
institutions and the federal government became a source of misrepresentation and 
generated distrust of Felipe Calderón’s administration.  Consequently, today Mexico 
is a much more insecure nation than in 2000 for two major reasons: one, Fox did not 
deactivate organized crime and never reformed Mexico’s institutions democratically 
and two, the major political actors do not share Calderón’s policies on national 
security and foreign policy (thus increasing Mexico’s vulnerabilities at the local, 
regional and federal levels).  
In the end, the new government has failed to produce a national security strategy 
based on Mexico’s national interest and place in the world.  There is no explicit link 
between national security law and the National Plan of Development to position 
Mexico internally and abroad, neither among the Army, Air Force, Navy, Public 
Security or Department of Justice.26 Without a doubt, the persistence of 
uncoordinated security apparatuses and an undefined common plan at all levels of 
government makes it certain that Mexico’s insecurity in North America can be 
exploited by an aggressive and dangerous American security strategy regionally and 
globally.   
Throughout its independence, Mexico has not articulated a coherent strategy on 
national security. With the election of President Fox in 2000, there were great 
expectations that he would implement state and national security reforms.  Despite 
high expectations for real change, continuity with the past has prevailed. The 
transformations have been partial and moreover are not being updated to address 
the growing risks confronting Mexico specifically and North America in general. 
Equally important, the president of the Republic no longer has the power of past 
authoritarian governments when the Congress acted as a rubber stamp for 
presidential initiatives. Mexico is now a more open society, government institutions 
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are more open, and there are strong channels for expression and dissidence. The 
challenge for Mexico is to find a national consensus on security that articulates the 
national priorities and defines in better terms the nation’s relationship with the 
United States and Canada.  After 9/11 the borders and the institutions of the United 
States and the international system were modified completely. The implications of 
these world-wide transformations have not been studied enough in Mexico. 
Moreover, the federal government has not responded effectively to the 
circumstances. Rather, political factions and interest group have prevailed over 
national consensus. Also, the three main political parties have not presented 
platforms regarding their views of the new security perimeter. The PRI, PAN, and 
PRD present very general lines and ambiguous comments on the idea of Mexican 
sovereignty and there is no accounting for the dilemma that the new security 
architecture of the United States – in its global dimension – represents for Mexico.27 
Historically, the possibility that the United States would encroach upon Mexican 
territory has been a source of a tension in Mexico. However, there is no national 
debate about the “new security perimeter,” only sporadic articles on the matter.28   
In order to coordinate successfully with the United States in the long run, Mexico 
needs to have a national discussion among the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches of government – in  addition to civil society and academia – to diagnose the 
costs of not having a strategy of State to confront the challenges of the new 
millennium. Based on the current framework of U.S. security and NORTHCOM, the 
possibilities of successful Mexican integration are farfetched.  
On the other hand, the United States has put forth several strategies to engage 
Mexico. For example, in 2005 former NORTHCOM Commander Timothy J. Keating, 
through the American Embassy in Mexico City, invited the Mexican Committee on 
Marine Affairs to Colorado Springs to share with them their infrastructure.29 The 
Committee on Marine Affairs revealed through La Gaceta Parlamentaria that they 
are studying the possibility of Mexico taking part in the U.S. Northern Command.30 
Furthermore, Major Lawrence Spinetta, U.S. Air Force, wrote that the Mexican 
Ministry of Defense (which consequently controls the Mexican Air Force) is unlikely 
to join NORAD.31 Actually, he was more enthusiastic about the potential of sharing 
information with the Mexican Secretary of Telecommunications and Transportation 
– information that can be more useful to the United States because it can facilitate 
the exchange of passenger lists, aviation movements within Mexican air space, and 
transit routes of airplanes flying from Mexico to the United States. With this type of 
information, the United States can better anticipate possible risks to their national 
territory. In any case, Major Spinetta stated that at least some U.S.-Mexican 
collaboration exists.32 Finally, Mexico is very far from really sharing institutional 
structures and information with the United States and Canada, or at least to the 
extent that United States shares intelligence with Britain or the European Union. 
But with the election of Felipe Calderón in 2006, there has emerged a “new 
opportunity” for cooperation between Mexico, United States, and Canada on security 
issues.33 “For the Pentagon, it’s an opportunity to work with Mexico’s armed forces 
as they start a gradual transition toward an external defense.”34 It has to do with 
Calderón’s main priorities of government: public security, employment, and the fight 
against poverty. The security issue has to do with combating drug trafficking as the 
main threat to Mexican national security. Accordingly, Calderon’s government has 
sought to negotiate with the U.S. government for an aid package of technology, 
equipment, and training in combating drug trafficking. This “Plan Mexico” has 
become more pressing with the explosions of gas pipeline facilities in Mexico that 
were allegedly caused by guerrilla groups in July and September 2007. Both 
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governments have agreed that “this security cooperation partnership does not 
involve U.S. military troops, only money for certain kinds of equipment.”35  However, 
the package does open a window to a long-held Pentagon aspiration of penetrating 
the Mexican military’s hermetically closed purchasing system. 
Additionally, General Victor Renuart, U.S. Commander of NORAD and 
NORTHCOM, has pointed out two areas of common concern in regards to military-
to-military relations with Mexico:  
During the recent North American Leaders’ summit in Montebello, Canada, 
on August 20-21, President Bush emphasized that the U.S. and Mexico share 
joint responsibilities for dealing with the common objective of having less 
violence on both sides of the border in the fight against transnational 
organized crime and narcotics trafficking. Mexican President Felipe Calderón 
has identified the activities of the narco cartels as a threat to Mexico’s 
development and national security.36  
As we can see, there is a clear convergence and consensus on a threat to both 
governments, one which is considered part of the Global War on Terror lead by 
Washington. Consequently, Mexican officials have accommodated themselves to one 
of the three main threats defined by Washington after 9/11: terrorism, natural 
disasters, and drug trafficking.  Furthermore, there is clear evidence of a “common 
ground” between Mexico and the United States set forth by the Bush and Calderón 
governments to deepen bilateral cooperation, but on an asymmetrical basis. In other 
words, when the American Armed Forces are the most powerful on Earth and have 
been extended globally, certainly, Calderon’s negotiations fit nicely with 
Washington’s interests regarding arms sales and security systems to patrol the 
Mexican border against drug trafficking.   
In this new venture, the Department of Defense and NORTHCOM are ready to 
respond to any Mexican requests for assistance, as General Renuart has noted, “given 
that President Calderón has directed his military to assist civilian law enforcement in 
cracking down on the cartels.”37  In the case of the attacks on natural gas pipelines in 
central Mexico, General Renuart further notes the U.S. military is ready to assist 
because 
[If such attacks are] occurring on a much broader scale, a force like the drug 
cartels or terrorists can try to hold a nation hostage because of that, then it 
has clearly a strategic impact…So we try to build exchanges, training 
opportunities, cooperation, discussion forums, to allow us to share ideas with 
the Mexican military and reach a common ground, a common understanding 
and a common view of how we can work together.38 
The other area of exploration has to do with more traditional “theater security” 
cooperation, the General added, where  
Mexicans are looking at ways to modernize their naval components, their air 
and surface defense of key infrastructure elements – the way they do force 
protection around critical infrastructure within the country. So there is 
potential for traditional foreign military sales, foreign military funding, 
education, training, theater security cooperation here.39 
General Renuart is right in that the natural gas pipeline attacks have proved that 
the intelligence services in Mexico – civil and military – have been overwhelmed by 
hostile actions this year and their failure in preventing these attacks reflects a much 
more strategic, regional scenario if Mexican services are penetrated by organized 
crime or terrorists in an attempt to attack the United States through Mexico.  Adding 
to this current internal situation and the security priorities of Calderon’s 
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government, it is clear a more homogeneous and compact vision within the cabinet, 
looking for improvement and more resources for their services from the Mexican 
Chamber of Deputies and the U.S. government, has not been seen since the 
establishment of the Joint U.S.-Mexico Commission of 1942.40 (At least in terms of 
Mexico’s approach to the United States on military matters).  
Responding to the new threats, the secretary of defense in his speech before the 
Mexican Chamber of Deputies declared that the equipment of the Army and the Air 
Force is outdated and they need to change their radar system because they “only 
operate three hours a day” and the rest of the day do not know what really happens in 
Mexican skies.41 In fact, he added that the “Merida Initiative” currently negotiated 
with Washington is “insufficient” for their needs.42  For its part, the Ministry of the 
Navy has argued almost simultaneously that new boats, helicopters, aircraft, radar, 
and marine vehicles are needed to fulfill a new national and regional security role.43 
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice has also declared that their aircraft system 
used in the war on drugs is really “old.”44  For practical purposes, and in order to 
close the cycle of this transition, the National Security Research Center (CISEN) has 
demonstrated the structural setbacks in policy prevention and preparation after the 
three explosions in central Mexico.45 These dynamics and transformations lie at the 
heart of Mexico’s political system, with security and sovereignty illustrating two 
crucial questions: (1) is Mexico in a vulnerable situation where internal and external 
threats can take advantage of its weaknesses, and (2) is this just the beginning of one 
on the most radical transformations of Mexico’s national sovereignty, security, and 
independence?   
CONCLUSION   
It remains to be seen what a more expeditious insertion of Mexico in the new North 
American security framework will imply for the future. For now, at the domestic 
level, Mexico is not prepared to respond to a terrorist attack along the U.S.-Mexico 
border. Nor is Mexico ready to establish a closer integration with the United States 
due to Mexico’s multiple limitations in terms of doctrine, technology, resources, and 
political consensus on the one hand and, on the other, the lack of a master plan for 
national security conception, institutionalization, and implementation at the federal 
and regional levels to define Mexico’s place in the world.    
There are other obstacles that remain. Political corruption in Mexico negatively 
impacts the development of regional security cooperation with the United States and 
Canada. Cultural and linguistic differences present further challenges for Mexico and 
the United States as opposed to the Canada-U.S. relationship, where the two 
countries share a more similar cultural heritage and have a history of cooperation 
(NATO or NORAD are two prominent examples). Finally, the future of U.S.-Mexico 
relations has to proceed with a clear premise of mutual recognition, respect, and 
interdependence at all levels. It is fair to argue that without mutual respect and 
knowledge of our differences and convergences, little will be possible in terms of 
developing a truly democratic bilateral and regional security strategy conceived to 
protect the general public, natural resources, territory, institutions, national identity, 
and sovereignty of Mexico. In the long run, the only effective means of developing a 
platform of “mutual responsibility” requires frank discussion of what an effective 
regional security cooperation plan entails. 
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